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Abstract: Standard models—based exclusively on macro-financial variables—have made 
little progress in explaining the behavior of exchange rates. In this paper, we introduce a 
neglected set of “soft power” factors capturing a country’s demographic, institutional, 
political and social underpinnings to shed some light on the “missing” determinants of 
exchange rate volatility over time and across countries. Based on a balanced panel dataset 
comprising 115 countries during the period 1996–2015, the empirical results are generally 
robust across different estimation methodologies and show a high degree of persistence in 
exchange rate volatility. After controlling for standard macroeconomic factors, we find that 
the “soft power” variables—such as an index of voice and accountability, life expectancy, 
educational attainments, fragility of the banking sector, financial openness, and the share of 
agriculture relative to services—have a statistically significant influence on the level of 
exchange rate volatility across countries. In other words, countries with greater “soft power” 
(i.e. better institutional quality) tend to experience a lower degree of exchange rate volatility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, major shifts in the global economy and 
financial markets have exacerbated the magnitude of exchange rate fluctuations. While 
Friedman (1953) famously argued that exchange rate volatility is a manifestation of 
macroeconomic volatility, empirical studies have uncovered a range of anomalies and 
puzzles that contradict the theoretical models of exchange rates. Meese and Rogoff (1983), 
for example, showed that there is no stable relationship between exchange rate fluctuations 
and fundamental factors, conflicting with the theoretical models predicting that exchange rate 
volatility can only increase when the variability of the underlying fundamentals increases. 
Exchange rate volatility is still of great interest to academics, policymakers, and market 
practitioners because the potential linkages between the behavior of exchange rates and other 
economic and financial variables.  
 
The general consensus in the literature is that exchange rate volatility reflects a variety of 
global and country-specific factors, such as income growth, inflation, fiscal and current 
account balances, foreign exchange reserves, financial and trade openness, and the size and 
type of capital flows. It has also been shown that structural characteristics of the foreign 
exchange market such as the exchange rate regime and technical features such as order flows 
influence the extent of exchange rate volatility. Notwithstanding a cascade of follow-up 
papers, however, the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983) remain unchallenged, with little 
progress in explaining—and predicting—exchange rate fluctuations with macroeconomic 
fundamentals. If exchange rates fluctuate beyond what is necessary to absorb real economic 
shocks, they become an autonomous source of shocks and instability. A significant share of 
exchange rate fluctuations is indeed shown to be explained by shocks originating in the 
foreign exchange market itself, due to movements in the exchange rate risk premium (Artis 
and Ehrmann, 2006; Farrant and Peersman, 2006).  
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to empirically shed some light on the “missing” cross-
country determinants of exchange rate volatility. Using a balanced panel comprising 115 
countries from 1996 to 2015, we investigate the importance of “soft power” variables that 
encapsulate a country’s demographic, institutional, political and social underpinnings that are 
generally ignored in the literature.2 In addition, we include a variety of control variables, 
drawn from the literature on exchange rate modeling, and which are expected to capture the 
conventional macro-financial determinants of exchange rate volatility. With regards to the 
“soft power” characteristics of individual countries, rather than relying on an arbitrary choice 
                                                
2 The concept of soft power—popularized by Nye (1990) in studying international relations—captures 
intangible resources beyond material considerations. Although the Institute for Government has developed an 
index of soft power for a limited set of countries over the period 2009–2012, it is difficult to quantify a multi-
dimensional concept in a single indicator. Accordingly, in this paper, we focus on the underlying factors of “soft 
power” in a broad set of countries over a longer span of time.    
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of a small set of variables, we take an ‘agnostic’ view and initially consider a wide range of 
demographic, institutional, political and social indicators. However, since there is inevitably 
a high degree of collinearity among the explanatory variables, we utilize a variable reduction 
technique that systematically eliminates those variables in the original set that are best 
explained by the remaining variables. 
 
While there is no theoretical model linking “soft power” to exchange rate volatility, we 
consider the institutions-growth nexus—a widespread consensus in the literature—as a useful 
illustration of the linkages we have in mind between a country’s “soft power” 
characteristics—underpinning its quality of institutions—and exchange rate fluctuations. 
Accordingly, we expect “soft power” factors to have a noticeable effect on exchange rate 
volatility—directly and indirectly—by enhancing complementarities between different kind 
of institutions, fostering better policy choices and shaping the pattern and evolution of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and risk premia. We present cross-country evidence that the 
volatility of exchange rates is significantly affected by “soft power” variables—such as an 
index of voice and accountability, life expectancy, educational attainments, fragility of the 
banking sector, financial openness, and the share of agriculture relative to services Our 
empirical analysis indicates that countries with greater “soft power” experience less 
exchange rate volatility. The results are robust to a number of important sensitivity checks, 
including different estimation approaches, sub-sample analysis and controlling for a host of 
conventional macroeconomic factors investigated in previous studies.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of 
the literature. Section III explains how we estimate exchange rate volatility. Sections IV and 
V describe our empirical methodology and data sources, respectively. The econometric 
results are presented in Section VI, while we offer concluding remarks in Section VII. 
 
2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The literature on exchange rates is vast, covering a wide range of theoretical and empirical 
strands. The volatility of exchange rates can have welfare costs through multiple channels, 
but mainly by increasing transaction costs and reducing the gains to international trade. A 
rich body of studies points out, albeit with mixed results, a negative effect of exchange rate 
volatility on investment, employment, growth, and international trade (Chowdhury, 1993; 
Federer, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Caballero and Pindyck, 
1996; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1998; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Dell’Ariccia 1999; Bleaney 
and Greenway, 2001; Sauer and Bohara, 2001; Devereux and Engel, 2003; Rosenberg, 2004; 
Chong and Gradstein, 2009; Baum and Caglayan, 2010). This is likely to be a significant 
concern in emerging market economies, especially where large exchange rate misalignments 
contribute to the risks of sudden reversals of capital flows.  
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With regards to the principal determinants of exchange rate volatility, the focus has been 
almost exclusively on macroeconomic fundamentals and structural characteristics of the 
foreign exchange market. Among the key findings in this literature is a positive link between 
real exchange rate volatility and the flexibility of nominal exchange rates (Mussa, 1986; 
Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995; Morales-Zumaquero and Sosvilla-
Rivero, 2010). The relationship between exchange rate volatility and economic openness, on 
the other hand, is less clear. While Hau (2002) and Bleaney (2008) show that more open 
economies tend to have lower exchange rate volatility, Amor (2008) finds the opposite result 
in the case of Asian countries. Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni (2006), on the other hand, show 
that exchange rate volatility is negatively related to trade openness and per capita GDP and 
positively to trade taxes and a measure of remoteness (trade-weighted distance from the rest 
of the world), concluding that trade costs increase exchange rate volatility. The literature also 
suggests that productivity shocks play an important role in explaining real exchange rate 
fluctuations (Alexius, 2005). Beyond macroeconomic fundamentals, Lyons (2001) and 
Canales-Kriljenko and Habermeier (2004) show that structural characteristics and technical 
features of the foreign exchange market may influence the degree of exchange rate volatility.  
 
There is no theoretical map linking measures of “soft power” to exchange rate volatility.3 
There is, however, a bourgeoning literature on the institutions-growth nexus, laying out a 
conceptual framework that is relevant to the analysis of how “soft power” can influence the 
behavior of exchange rates (or other asset prices, for that matter). There is now widespread 
consensus among scholars and policymakers that institutions—generally defined as the 
economic, legal, political, and social organization of a country—are a fundamental 
determinant of cross-country differences in economic performance (North and Thomas, 
1973; La Porta and others, 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Acemoglu and 
others (2003) expand this negative relationship to macroeconomic volatility, as measured by 
the volatility of the growth rate of output per worker, and demonstrate that macroeconomic 
policies have no predictive power after controlling for the impact of institutions. The 
institutions-growth nexus also helps to clarify the linkages between “soft power” 
characteristics—underpinning the quality and complementarity of different kinds of 
institutions—and exchange rate volatility. 
 
The contribution of this paper is therefore to investigate the nature and scale of relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and institutional infrastructure and social features across 
countries. We expect to see “soft power” factors to have a prominent role in determining 
exchange rate volatility—directly and indirectly—by fostering better policy choices and 
shaping the pattern and evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals and risk premia.   
 
                                                
3 Phillips and others (2013) empirically link exchange rates to indicators of demographics, institutions and 
social policy in assessing current accounts, but this analysis does not attempt to explain exchange rate volatility.  
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3. MEASURING EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 
Rather than focusing exclusively on the behavior of bilateral exchange rates, we adopt an 
aggregate view of exchange rate volatility, using trade shares as weights to obtain the 
volatility of a country’s effective exchange rate. It is also important to realize that the degree 
of exchange rate variability to which a country is exposed is not necessarily closely related to 
the type of exchange rate regime it has adopted. A country may peg its currency to an anchor 
currency (or a basket of currencies), but will float against all other currencies if the anchor 
currency does as well. Accordingly, since the choice between using the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER) and the real effective exchange rate (REER) is not likely to affect 
significantly measured volatility or the econometric results, we prefer the REER as the unit 
of measurement in this analysis. 
 
We measure the annual volatility of the exchange rate as the natural logarithm of the realized 
variance of the trade-weighted REER return, computed using monthly returns. In particular, 
we define the volatility of the exchange rate for country i in year t as  
 
(1) VOL!,! = ln 𝑟!,!!!!!/!"!!"!!!  
 
where 𝑟!,!!!!!/!" = ln𝑠!,!!!!!/!" − ln𝑠!,!!!!(!!!)/!" is the change in the natural logarithm of 
the REER for country i between month k–1 and month k of year t–1, and 𝑠!,!!!!!/!" is the 
exchange rate at the end of month k of year t.  
 
Figure 1 plots the realized standard deviation of REER returns over time, averaged across 
countries, both for the full sample (Panel A) and the developed and emerging market sub-
samples (Panel B). Exchange rate volatility declined from an average of 7.3 percent in the 
second half of the 1990s to 5.7 percent during the period 2000–07 before the global financial 
crisis of 2008, driven mainly by the moderation in emerging market economies. Furthermore, 
the difference between average exchange rate volatility between advanced and developing 
countries narrowed from the peak of 5.6 percentage points in 1998 to 1.1 percentage points in 
2007. Although the global financial crisis resulted in a surge in exchange rate volatility to 8.6 
percent in 2008, the behavior of trade-weighted REERs moderated towards the pre-crisis 
level by 2015. However, there is substantial variation across countries and over time, with a 
minimum of 0.7 percent to a maximum of 82 percent during the period 1996–2015. 
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4. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
The “soft power” variables are more likely to have an impact on exchange rate volatility in 
the cross-section rather than the time series, and accordingly our starting point is a pooled 
regression that attempts to uncover this:  
 
(2) VOL!,! =  𝜇 + 𝛼!VOL!,!!!!!!! +  𝛽′𝐗!,! +  𝛾!𝐙!,! +  𝜀!,!  
 
where VOL!,! is the volatility of the REER for country i in year t, as defined in Section III, 𝐗!,! is a Jx1 vector of structural variables, 𝐙!,! is a Kx1 vector of macroeconomic control 
variables and 𝜀!,! is a random error, which we assume to be uncorrelated across time and 
countries. The dynamic nature of the model reflects the fact that it is well documented in the 
literature that at short horizons, the volatility of exchange rate returns is a highly persistent 
process. The degree of persistence in volatility decreases as the return horizon increases but, 
as we show below, it remains significant at the annual horizon used in this study. In the 
empirical analysis, we set K=2. 
 
We begin the analysis by estimating the pooled model given by (2) using two approaches. In 
the first, we assume that all of the right hand side variables are strictly exogenous and use 
OLS. In the second, we assume that the control variables, 𝐙!,!, are pre-determined and use the 
Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, with the first lag of the control variables used as 
instruments. In both cases, we report robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The 
model is estimated both for the full sample of 115 countries and the sub-sample of 90 
developing countries and 25 advanced countries. 
 
Global	Average Sub-Sample	Average
Figure	1:	Exchange	Rate	Volatility	1995-2015
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To further explore the relationship between exchange rate volatility and the “soft power” 
variables, we consider a fixed effects version of the model: 
 
(3) VOL!,! =  𝜇! + 𝛼!VOL!,!!!!!!! +  𝛽′𝐗!,! +  𝛾!𝐙!,! +  𝜀!,!  
 
where 𝜇! is an unobserved country-specific effect. The presence of the country-specific effect 
in conjunction with the lagged dependent variable creates a bias in the usual least squares 
dummy variable estimator when the time dimension is fixed, since demeaning creates a 
correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable in the transformed 
model. We therefore estimate the model using the System Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach of Blundell and Bond (1998). This involves constructing two sets of 
equations, one with first differences of the endogenous and pre-determined variables 
instrumented by suitable lags of their own levels, and one with the levels of the endogenous 
and pre-determined variables instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences.4 
Strictly exogenous variables in the model enter the instrument matrix in the conventional 
way, i.e. in first differences or levels depending on the equation, with one column per 
instrument. The number of available instruments increases with the time period t and so the 
model is estimated as a system of equations, with one equation for each period. 
 
The System GMM approach yields consistent estimates of the model parameters while 
allowing for potential endogeneity in the regressors. We estimate two versions of the model 
given by Equation (3). In the first, we assume that the control variables, 𝐙!,! , are strictly 
exogenous. In the second, we assume that they are endogenous. In both cases, we assume 
that the structural variables are strictly exogenous. We use one-step GMM and report robust 
standard errors.5 We also report the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions for the joint 
validity of the instruments. As an additional test of the validity of the instruments, we report 
the Arellano and Bond (1998) test for second-order serial correlation in the error term of the 
first-difference equation.6 
  
The use of all available lagged levels of the variables in the GMM estimation leads to a 
proliferation in the number of instruments. This reduces the efficiency of the estimator in 
finite samples, and potentially leads to over-fitting. This is a particular problem when the 
right hand side variables are assumed to be pre-determined or endogenous, since for these 
                                                
4 The use of the Difference GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991), which uses only the first difference 
equation, yields similar results but with reduced statistical significance for some variables. 
5 The use of the two-step GMM yields similar results but with reduced statistical significance for some 
variables. 
6 The error term in the first-difference equation is first order serially correlated by construction, but higher order 
serial correlation should be zero under the maintained assumption that the error term in Equation (3) is serially 
uncorrelated. 
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variables, each time period contributes a separate vector to the instrument matrix. A further 
issue is that the use of a large number of instruments significantly weakens the Hansen J test 
of over-identifying restrictions, and so the detection of over-identification is hardest when it 
is most needed. Conversely, however, restricting the instrument set too much results in a loss 
of information that leads to imprecisely estimated coefficients. Estimation of such models 
therefore involves a delicate balance between maximizing the information extracted from the 
data on the one hand, and guarding against over-identification on the other. 
 
To establish the robustness of our results, therefore, we estimate various specifications of the 
model. First, only the one or two most recent lags of the available instruments are used in the 
GMM estimation. Second, the instruments are collapsed into a single vector, which reduces 
the number of moment conditions for a given number of instrument lags used. Third, the 
control variables are replaced by their significant principal components (i.e. those that have 
an associated eigenvalue greater than unity). We report the results obtained using different 
combinations of these restrictions.  
 
5. DATA 
Our objective in this paper is to empirically investigate the importance of “soft power” 
variables that encapsulate a country’s demographic, institutional, political and social 
underpinnings that are generally ignored in the literature. Accordingly, we include a number 
of control variables, drawn from the literature on exchange rate modeling, and which are 
expected to capture the conventional macro-financial drivers of exchange rate volatility.  
With regards to the “soft power” factors, we take an ‘agnostic’ view and consider a wide 
range of demographic, institutional, political and social indicators. We expect these “soft 
power” characteristics such as governance and social conditions to have a significant effect 
on exchange rate volatility—directly and indirectly—by fostering better policy choices and 
shaping the pattern and evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals and risk premia. 
 
The empirical analysis employs annual data for a broad panel of 115 countries, as well as the 
sub-samples of 25 advanced economies and 90 developing countries, over the period 1996–
2015.7 We use the IMF’s country classification system to label countries as “advanced” and 
“emerging and developing” according to (1) per capita income level, (2) export 
diversification—so natural resource exporters that tend to have high per capita GDP would 
not make the classification for advanced economy, and (3) degree of integration into the 
global financial system. The full list of countries is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The choice of sample represents a balance between data availability for individual countries 
                                                
7 Although we have a relatively short time dimension, the balanced panel used in this paper provides equal 
heterogeneity conditional distribution and thereby should yield more robust estimations than unbalanced panels 
generally exploited in the empirical literature. 
9 
 
 
and a desire to have a large a sample as possible. In this section, we provide a detailed 
description of the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The volatility of each country’s exchange rate, VOL!,!, is measured by the realized volatility 
of the REER, as described in Section III, constructed using monthly data drawn from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.  
 
Control Variables 
 
We include 10 control variables, drawn from the literature on exchange rate modeling, and 
which are expected to capture the fundamental macroeconomic drivers of exchange rate 
volatility. The control variables are consumer price inflation, the volatility of the terms of 
trade, the volatility of labor productivity growth, the volatility of the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, the ratio of the current account balance to GDP, trade openness, export 
concentration, the exchange rate regime, the ratio of credit to GDP, and stock market 
capitalization. These series are compiled from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
and World Economic Outlook databases and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. Panel B of Table A2 in the appendix gives the precise definitions of the 
control variables, their sources and expected signs. 
 
“Soft Power” Variables 
 
Rather than relying on an arbitrary choice of a small set of variables to capture the “soft 
power” characteristics of individual countries, we take an ‘agnostic’ view and initially 
consider a wide range of demographic, institutional, political and social indicators drawn 
from a number of different sources. In particular, we start with a universe of 20 variables, 
split into five broad categories:  
 
Governance: Political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption, and voice and accountability. 
 
Population: Median age, total fertility rate, infant mortality rate , life expectancy, and child 
dependency. 
 
Education: Average years of primary schooling, average years of secondary schooling, and 
average years of tertiary schooling. 
 
Financial Sector: Bank z-score, bank concentration, and financial openness . 
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Development: Real GDP per capita GDP, the share of agriculture in GDP, and the share of 
agriculture in GDP relative to the service sector. 
 
The data for these variables are drawn from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
database, the Polity IV Database, and the International Country Risk Guide. Panel A of 
Table A1 in the Appendix gives precise definitions of the 20 “soft power” variables, their 
sources and their expected signs with respect to exchange rate volatility. 
 
There is inevitably a high degree of collinearity among the control and “soft power” 
variables, both among variables within the same category, and among variables in different 
categories. As is well known, while collinearity does not invalidate the estimation of the 
econometric model, it may complicate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients by 
inflating the associated standard errors, potentially making it difficult to distinguish the 
marginal effects of individual variables. In the sample, absolute pairwise correlations range 
from zero to close to unity. As might be expected, the highest correlations are between 
variables within the same category (for example, a correlation of 0.96 between government 
effectiveness and the rule of law), but there are also some high correlations between variables 
in different categories (for example, a correlation of 0.83 between real GDP per capita and 
control of corruption).  
 
In the panel data model that we estimate, we allow for unobserved time fixed effects, and in 
some cases, also country fixed effects. This will tend to reduce collinearity since the pairwise 
correlation between any two variables arises partly from common year or country effects. For 
example, the correlation between government effectiveness and the rule of law falls from 
0.96 to 0.46 once both variables are demeaned by year and by country. Nevertheless, in spite 
of the fact that the inclusion of year and country effects in the model will tend to reduce 
effective pairwise correlations, we mitigate the effects of potential collinearity among the 
predictor variables by using variable reduction, which eliminates those variables in the 
original set that are best explained by the remaining variables according to a statistical 
criterion.  
 
The variable reduction technique that we employ is based on the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of each variable 𝑥!, which is given by  
 𝑉𝐼𝐹! = 11− 𝑅!! 
 
where 𝑅!! is the coefficient of determination in a regression of 𝑥! on the remaining variables. 
The VIF measures the extent to which a variable can be explained by a linear combination of 
the remaining variables, and shows how much the variance of the estimated coefficient is 
increased as a result of collinearity (see, for example, Chatterjee and Hadi, 1986) 
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We recursively estimate the VIF for each of the entire set of 20 “soft power” variables, each 
time dropping the variable that has the highest VIF. We continue until no variable has a VIF 
higher than 5.0. This yields a final set of nine “soft power” variables: political stability, voice 
and accountability, life expectancy , primary education, tertiary education, bank z-score, 
bank concentration, financial openness, and the share of agriculture in GDP relative to the 
service sector. The number of variables retained within each category in the full sample 
ranges from one (for the population category) to three (for the financial sector category).  
 
We undertake two robustness checks to explore the sensitivity of the final model 
specification to the way in which the variable reduction procedure is implemented. First, we 
used an alternative—and more conservative—VIF threshold of 2.5, which yields six “soft 
power” variables. The lower VIF threshold inevitably reduces the number of retained 
variables, leading to a more parsimonious model with somewhat lower collinearity between 
the variables. However, all of the variables in both the governance and development 
categories are eliminated when the lower VIF threshold is employed. Second, we applied the 
variable reduction procedure after demeaning each variable by both country and year (i.e. 
after extracting fixed country and year effects). Owing to the lower pairwise correlations 
between the demeaned variables, fewer variables are dropped, but the qualitative conclusions 
that we draw are broadly similar. We report results only for the VIF cut-off of 5.0 applied to 
the 20 “soft power” variables without demeaning.8  
 
The control variables generally have much lower pairwise correlations, both with each other, 
and with the control variables. For example, the highest correlation within the set of control 
variables is 0.56 (between the volatility of the terms of trade and export concentration), and 
the highest correlation between the control variables and the “soft power” variables is 0.51 
(between median age  and export concentration). As a check, we applied the variable 
reduction procedure described above to the combined set of 30 “soft power” and control 
variables. With a VIF threshold of 5.0, none of the control variables is eliminated. Even at 
the VIF threshold of 2.5, all of the control variables are retained. Moreover, the set of “soft 
power” variables that was retained (using either VIF threshold) was almost identical to when 
the control variables were excluded from the variable reduction procedure.  
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
We begin the analysis by first reporting the results of the pooled panel model using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, in Table 1, for our full sample of 115 countries as 
well as the sub-samples of 25 developed and 90 emerging market economies over the period 
1996–2015. We estimate both static and dynamic versions of the pooled OLS model. The 
results show that lagged exchange rate volatility in the dynamic model is statistically highly 
                                                
8 The results for the other cases are available on request. 
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significant for all three sample groups, indicating a high degree of persistence in currency 
volatility over time. It should be noted that while its inclusion does not alter the sign of most 
of the other variables included in the analysis, it significantly lowers the magnitude of the 
other coefficients. Furthermore, the persistence of exchange rate volatility appears to be 
substantially greater in emerging market economies than in developed countries.  
 
Turning first to the control variables, the pattern of coefficients is broadly as expected, but 
the magnitude and statistical significance of the relationship varies between advanced and 
emerging market economies. The estimated coefficient on consumer price inflation, which 
tends to capture macroeconomic stability, has the predicted positive sign, and with a greater 
magnitude in the case of advanced economies. Trade openness is a highly significant factor 
with a dampening effect on exchange rate volatility, while the volatility of both productivity 
growth and terms of trade appear to have an insignificant effect on (except in the case of 
developing countries where the volatility of terms of trade is found to contribute to greater 
exchange rate volatility). In line with previous research, the type of exchange rate regime is a 
significant determinant of exchange rate volatility, as greater flexibility leads to a higher 
level of currency volatility. The impact of exchange rate regime is present across all 
countries, but stronger in developing economies. Finally, measures of financial development 
(the ratio of credit to GDP and stock market capitalization) appear to have some positive 
effect on exchange rate volatility, except in the case of in developing countries.     
 
The results obtained from the pooled panel estimation show that a number of “soft power” 
variables are statistically significant, highlighting the influence of intangible resources 
underpinned by demographic, institutional, political and social characteristics. In particular, 
we find that the index of voice and accountability and life expectancy have dampening 
effects on exchange rate volatility. Likewise, financial openness, the Z-score of banks, and 
the share of agriculture in GDP relative to the service sector lower the volatility of exchange 
rates. These findings remain broadly robust to the inclusion of lagged exchange rate 
volatility, as well as for the sub-samples of advanced and developing countries. Interestingly, 
the results show that primary schooling contributes to greater exchange rate volatility across 
all countries (but not statistically insignificant in the case of emerging markets), while 
tertiary educational attainments appear to have statistically significant, but with differing 
effects—increasing exchange rate volatility in advanced economies and lowering currency 
volatility  in developing countries.9 The estimations based on the IV approach, presented in 
Table 2, are broadly similar in terms of the sign and magnitude of coefficients in the pooled 
panel data estimations, but yield different results in terms of statistical significance.  
 
                                                
9 Although human capital is inevitably measured with substantial error (Cohen and Soto, 2007), these findings 
remain robust if we use alternative measures of educational attainments, and indicate a nonlinear effect of 
human capital accumulation.  
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The estimations based on the pooled panel model exclude unobserved country-specific 
effects. We therefore estimate a fixed-effects version of the dynamic model given by 
Equation (3) for the sample of 115 countries, using the System GMM technique, initially 
under the assumption that both the control and “soft power” variables are strictly exogenous. 
Table 3 presents the four specifications estimated using various combinations of instrument 
reduction. In specification (1), all available lags of the lagged dependent variable are used as 
GMM instruments, with each contributing a vector to the instrument matrix. The lagged 
exchange rate volatility remains highly significant, with a coefficient of 0.391 for t-1 and 
0.157 for t-2, suggesting that volatility is highly persistent. A number of the control variables 
are significant, and with the expected signs. Of the “soft power” variables, voice and 
accountability, life expectancy, primary schooling, fragility of the banking sector as 
measured by the Z-score , and financial openness are highly significant across all 
specifications of the model, and all except primary education have the expected sign.  
 
We investigate the robustness of the System GMM results by considering alternative 
specifications that reduce the instrument set by restricting the number of lags used as 
instruments to the most recent two (specification (2)), collapsing the instruments into a single 
vector (specification (3), and both (specification (4). These restrictions all lead to a reduction 
in the p-value of the Hansen J test, and in the case of specifications (2) and (3), there is 
evidence that the instrument set is misspecified. However, specification (4), which uses 
‘only’ 40 instruments (versus the 225 instruments used in the unrestricted case), appears to 
be reasonably well specified in terms of instrument choice. The estimation results for this 
specification (as well as for specifications (2) and (3)) are broadly similar to the unrestricted 
case. The notable difference is that the coefficient on lagged exchange rate volatility, while 
remaining statistically very significant, is somewhat lower in value, suggesting lower 
persistence. The remaining coefficients are generally similar, though larger in magnitude. 
The preliminary conclusion from Table 3, under which it is assumed that both the control and 
“soft power” variables are strictly exogenous, is therefore that exchange rate volatility is 
negatively related to life expectancy, fragility of the banking sector and financial openness, 
and positively related to primary schooling. 
 
With the aim of reducing the instrument set further, Table 4 repeats the estimation of Table 3, 
but with the control variables replaced by their four significant principal components (i.e. 
those with an associated eigenvalue greater than one). All four specifications yield 
coefficient estimates on the “soft power” variables that are similar to those reported in Table 
3, with the exception that voice and accountability is now statistically significant. In all four 
cases, the third and fourth principal components are statistically significant at the one percent 
level, the second principal component is significant at the 10 percent level, while the first 
principal component is insignificant. Again, the first specification, in which the instrument 
set is unrestricted, gives no evidence of misspecification although this may be caused by the 
proliferation of instruments. This is confirmed by the fact that for the second specification, 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity is strongly rejected. However, the third and fourth 
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specifications appear to be well specified. The estimated coefficients are similar to the 
coefficients for the corresponding specification in Table 3, and the overall conclusions,  
remain unchanged. 
 
The analysis thus far has assumed that both the control and the “soft power” variables are 
strictly exogenous. However, feedback effects between exchange rate volatility and 
economic conditions would lead to a violation of this assumption. Table 5 therefore considers 
an alternative specification of the model in which the control variables, which largely capture 
macroeconomic determinants of exchange rate volatility, are assumed to be endogenous. This 
inevitably leads to a significant increase in the number of instruments that are available in the 
estimation of the model. To mitigate the effect of this, we continue to use the first four 
principal components of the control variables in place of the variables themselves. We 
consider three of the four specifications of the instrument set used in Tables 3 and 4. In 
particular, we omit the case where all available lags are used as instruments in their 
uncollapsed form since this yields an unfeasibly large instrument set. However, in addition to 
using the two most recent lags of the instruments, we also consider the case where only the 
single most recent lag is used, both uncollapsed and collapsed.  
 
Using the two most recent lags of the instruments, uncollapsed, (specification (1)), the 
second, third and fourth principal components of the control variables are again significant, 
and have the same signs and similar magnitudes as in Table 4. The coefficients on lagged 
exchange rate volatility are highly significant, and the coefficients on the “soft power” 
variables are similar to the previous case. Very similar estimation results are obtained when 
just the single most recent lag used (specification (2)). But again, in both of these 
specifications, the inability of the Hansen J test to reject the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity may be due to the number of instruments used. Indeed, when the instrument set is 
collapsed, which substantially reduces the total number of instruments, there is weak 
evidence of misspecification when either the full set of lags is used (specification (3)) or 
when only the two most recent lags are used (specification (4)). The estimated coefficients on 
the “soft power” variables and on lagged exchange rate volatility are largely unchanged, and 
the coefficients on the third, fourth and fifth principal components of the control variables 
remain statistically significant. Finally, using only the most recent lag of the instruments, 
collapsed into a single vector (specification (5)), the model appears to be well specified, and 
the coefficient estimates are similar to those obtained with the other specifications. However, 
the further reduction in the size of the instrument set is detrimental to the precision of the 
estimation leading to somewhat larger standard errors. Overall, the results from Table 5 
suggest that allowing for endogeneity in the control variables does not significantly affect the 
estimated relationship between exchange rate volatility and the “soft power” variables. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A rich body of empirical research has identified a number of anomalies and puzzles that 
contradict the theoretical models of exchange rates and showed no robust relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and the variability of underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals. As conventional empirical models have made little progress in explaining the 
behavior of exchange rates, in this paper we attempt to uncover the “missing” sources of 
exchange rate volatility by introducing a neglected set of factors. Using a balanced panel 
dataset comprising of 115 advanced and developing countries over the period 1996–2015, in 
addition to standard macroeconomic factors, we consider 20 “soft power” variables that 
encapsulate a country’s demographic, institutional, political and social underpinnings.  
 
The empirical results are generally robust across different estimation methodologies, as well 
as for the sub-samples of advanced and developing countries. First, we show that exchange 
rate volatility is highly persistent over time, especially in emerging market economies. 
Second, we find cross-country evidence that the level of exchange rate volatility is 
significantly influenced by “soft power” variables—such as an index of voice and 
accountability, life expectancy, educational attainments, financial openness, the Z-score of 
banks, and the share of agriculture relative to services. In particular, we find that countries 
with greater “soft power” experience less exchange rate volatility. Robustness checks reveal 
that the effect of “soft power” remains significant after controlling for a host of standard 
macroeconomic variables investigated in previous studies.  
 
What is the link, for example, between life expectancy and exchange rate volatility? We 
reason that improvements in life expectancy—and education—foster human capital 
accumulation and thereby contribute to an atmosphere that is less conducive to financial 
volatility. Accordingly, the empirical analysis presented in this paper has a number of policy 
implications related to minimizing the distortionary effects of excessive exchange rate 
volatility. In line with the existing literature, we show that macroeconomic strength remains a 
crucial axis of exchange rate stability. Beyond the standard metrics, however, we find that 
countries with greater “soft power” (i.e. better institutional quality) tend to experience a 
lower degree of exchange rate volatility. Therefore, institutional and structural reforms would 
also help reduce exchange rate volatility. This paper, in our view, is as a first step and calls 
for further empirical and theoretical studies to unlock the interactions between quantitative 
measures of “soft power” and exchange rates.  
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Table 1. The Determinants of FX Volatility 
Pooled Model (Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
The table reports the results of estimating the pooled panel data model given by Equation (2) 
over the period 1996-2015 using the Ordinary Least Squares method. Results are reported for 
the full sample of 115 countries, the sub-sample of 25 developed countries and the sub-
sample of 90 emerging countries. Year dummies are included in the estimation but not 
reported. The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ 
and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. 
 
 
Static Dynamic 
 
All Developed Emerging All Developed Emerging 
      
Volatility (t – 1)    0.439*** 0.345*** 0.403*** 
 
   (0.028) (0.054) (0.031) 
      
Volatility (t – 2)     0.200*** 0.178*** 0.158*** 
 
   (0.026) (0.056) (0.028) 
Control variables 
       
Inflation 2.223*** 4.668*** 2.170*** 1.270*** 4.144*** 1.361*** 
 
(0.347) (1.440) (0.309) (0.256) (1.564) (0.252) 
 
      
Vol of productivity growth 0.817 2.305 0.787 -0.163 1.606 -0.080 
 
(0.815) (2.313) (0.680) (0.471) (2.228) (0.457) 
 
      
Vol of terms of trade 0.302 0.345 0.420* -0.061 -0.079 0.040 
 
(0.205) (0.855) (0.218) (0.169) (0.791) (0.178) 
 
      
Vol of gov cons/GDP 0.212 -6.413 1.742 0.129 -2.544 0.938 
 
(1.925) (6.650) (1.924) (1.662) (6.398) (1.697) 
 
      
Current account/GDP 0.022 0.610 0.465** 0.054 0.577 0.214 
 
(0.167) (0.395) (0.181) (0.119) (0.366) (0.134) 
 
      
Trade openness -0.119*** -0.135*** -0.099*** -0.039** -0.071* -0.046 
 
(0.024) (0.040) (0.033) (0.020) (0.036) (0.028) 
 
      
Export concentration index 0.296*** 0.164 -0.012 0.171** 0.089 0.064 
 
(0.087) (0.374) (0.095) (0.075) (0.335) (0.082) 
 
      
FX regime 0.229*** 0.167*** 0.298*** 0.077*** 0.115** 0.118*** 
 
(0.021) (0.055) (0.023) (0.019) (0.047) (0.023) 
17 
 
 
 
      
Credit/GDP 0.022 0.307*** 0.023 0.043 0.177*** 0.062 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.060) (0.032) (0.051) (0.053) 
       
Stock market cap/GDP 0.096*** 0.070 0.041 0.021 0.015 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.026) (0.018) (0.038) (0.023) 
“Soft power” variables 
       
Political stability -0.025 0.331*** -0.029 -0.019 0.145** -0.025 
 
(0.021) (0.066) (0.023) (0.017) (0.057) (0.019) 
 
      
Voice and accountability -0.105*** -0.164** -0.037 -0.022 -0.067 -0.001 
 
(0.024) (0.076) (0.024) (0.019) (0.075) (0.021) 
 
      
Life expectancy  -0.015*** 0.131*** -0.012*** -0.006*** 0.071*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
 
      
Primary schooling 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.006 0.022** 0.042 0.001 
 
(0.010) (0.034) (0.011) (0.009) (0.031) (0.010) 
 
      
Tertiary schooling 0.029 0.703*** -0.162*** 0.001 0.348*** -0.083* 
 
(0.049) (0.085) (0.053) (0.039) (0.083) (0.049) 
 
      
Bank Z-score -0.010*** -0.006* -0.012*** -0.003** -0.003 -0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
      
Bank concentration 0.000 0.001 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
      
Financial openness -0.050*** -0.083* -0.026** -0.023*** -0.021 -0.016* 
 
(0.009) (0.045) (0.010) (0.008) (0.045) (0.009) 
 
      
GDP agriculture minus services -0.185* -0.156 -0.510*** -0.127 -0.336 -0.273*** 
 
(0.100) (0.505) (0.098) (0.078) (0.442) (0.082) 
 
      
Observations 2070 450 1620 2070 450 1620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.398 0.682 0.389 0.611 0.750 0.554 
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Table 2. The Determinants of FX Volatility 
Pooled Model (Instrumental Variables) 
 
The table reports the results of estimating the pooled panel data model given by Equation (2) 
over the period 1996-2015 using the Instrumental Variable method. The control variables are 
assumed to be pre-determined and the first lags are used as instruments. Results are reported 
for the full sample of 115 countries, the sub-sample of 25 developed countries and the sub-
sample of 90 emerging countries. Year dummies are included in the estimation but not 
reported. The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ 
and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. 
 
 
Static Dynamic 
 
All Developed Emerging All Developed Emerging 
      
Volatility (t – 1)    0.476*** 0.359*** 0.448*** 
 
   (0.030) (0.054) (0.034) 
      
Volatility (t – 2)     0.206*** 0.186*** 0.171*** 
 
   (0.026) (0.055) (0.029) 
Control variables 
       
Inflation 2.971*** 3.459 2.856*** 0.393 -1.482 0.585* 
 
(0.420) (4.937) (0.382) (0.314) (4.449) (0.325) 
 
      
Vol of productivity growth 0.629 4.600 0.491 -0.421 1.271 -0.398 
 
(0.960) (3.283) (0.749) (0.496) (3.039) (0.467) 
 
      
Vol of terms of trade 0.602** 0.726 0.769*** -0.006 -0.092 0.118 
 
(0.247) (0.971) (0.253) (0.209) (0.897) (0.211) 
 
      
Vol of gov cons/GDP -0.927 -6.846 0.867 0.260 -2.051 1.143 
 
(2.337) (8.666) (2.364) (1.872) (8.375) (1.891) 
 
      
Current account/GDP -0.220 0.277 0.333 -0.244* -0.392 -0.098 
 
(0.199) (0.734) (0.223) (0.139) (0.704) (0.161) 
 
      
Trade openness -0.115*** -0.130** -0.115*** -0.040* -0.038 -0.069** 
 
(0.024) (0.052) (0.034) (0.021) (0.048) (0.029) 
 
      
Export concentration index 0.285*** 0.266 -0.044 0.222*** 0.396 0.123 
 
(0.095) (0.433) (0.104) (0.084) (0.413) (0.093) 
 
      
FX regime 0.223*** 0.170*** 0.280*** 0.060*** 0.067 0.082*** 
 
(0.023) (0.062) (0.025) (0.020) (0.063) (0.024) 
 
      
Credit/GDP 0.070 0.306*** 0.113* 0.018 0.124** 0.065 
 (0.044) (0.058) (0.067) (0.034) (0.054) (0.058) 
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Stock market cap/GDP 0.094*** 0.057 0.024 0.027 0.031 0.002 
 (0.024) (0.054) (0.029) (0.021) (0.052) (0.026) 
“Soft power” variables 
       
Political stability -0.013 0.338*** -0.021 -0.030* 0.153*** -0.035* 
 
(0.021) (0.065) (0.022) (0.018) (0.056) (0.020) 
 
      
Voice and accountability -0.112*** -0.141* -0.038 -0.018 -0.044 0.002 
 
(0.024) (0.078) (0.024) (0.019) (0.079) (0.020) 
 
      
Life expectancy  -0.015*** 0.133*** -0.012*** -0.004** 0.072*** -0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) 
 
      
Primary schooling 0.072*** 0.084** 0.007 0.023*** 0.033 0.007 
 
(0.011) (0.033) (0.012) (0.009) (0.032) (0.010) 
 
      
Tertiary schooling 0.020 0.705*** -0.164*** 0.014 0.325*** -0.055 
 
(0.048) (0.086) (0.053) (0.041) (0.084) (0.051) 
 
      
Bank Z-score -0.009*** -0.005 -0.011*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
      
Bank concentration 0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
      
Financial openness -0.043*** -0.070 -0.017* -0.028*** -0.027 -0.020** 
 
(0.010) (0.053) (0.010) (0.008) (0.049) (0.009) 
 
      
GDP agriculture minus services -0.199* -0.252 -0.516*** -0.117 -0.237 -0.235*** 
 
(0.104) (0.627) (0.103) (0.077) (0.532) (0.081) 
 
      
Observations 2070 450 1620 2070 450 1620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.387 0.680 0.377 0.598 0.734 0.539 
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Table 3. The Determinants of FX Volatility 
Fixed Effects Model (GMM) 
Control Variables Assumed to be Strictly Exogenous 
 
The table reports the results of estimating the dynamic panel data model given by Equation 
(2) for the sample of 115 countries over the period 1996-2015 using one-step system GMM. 
The control variables and structural variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous. In 
specifications (1) and (3), all lags from 2 onwards are used as GMM instruments. In 
specifications (2) and (4), lags 2 and 3 are used as GMM instruments. In specifications (3) 
and (4), the GMM instruments are collapsed into a single column. Year dummies are 
included in the estimation but not reported. The table reports the estimated coefficients and 
robust standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The Hansen J test tests the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid in the presence of overidentification. The AR2 test is the Arellano-
Bond test of the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the errors of the first 
difference equation. The table also reports the number of observations and the number of 
instruments. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
  Lags used for GMM 2, - 2, 3 2, - 2, 3 
Instruments collapsed No No Yes Yes 
     
Volatility (t – 1) 0.391*** 0.355*** 0.358*** 0.307*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.043) 
 
    
Volatility (t – 2) 0.157*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.082** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.026) (0.033) 
Control variables 
     
Inflation 1.397*** 1.494*** 1.485*** 1.620*** 
 
(0.246) (0.258) (0.277) (0.299) 
 
    
Vol of productivity growth -0.024 0.082 0.072 0.219 
 
(0.755) (0.850) (0.846) (0.979) 
 
    
Vol of terms of trade -0.007 0.034 0.03 0.087 
 
(0.175) (0.191) (0.188) (0.212) 
 
    
Vol of gov cons/GDP 0.156 0.176 0.174 0.202 
 
(2.405) (2.504) (2.494) (2.643) 
 
    
Current account/GDP 0.047 0.042 0.042 0.035 
 
(0.148) (0.167) (0.166) (0.194) 
 
    
Trade openness -0.051* -0.059* -0.058* -0.070* 
 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) 
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Export concentration index 0.188** 0.200** 0.199** 0.217** 
 
(0.076) (0.087) (0.085) (0.100) 
 
    
FX regime 0.099*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) 
 
    
Credit/GDP 0.039 0.036 0.037 0.032 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.054) (0.063) 
     
Stock market cap/GDP 0.031 0.040 0.039 0.050 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) 
“Soft power” variables 
     
Political stability -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) 
 
    
Voice and accountability -0.034 -0.043 -0.042 -0.055 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.035) 
 
    
Life expectancy  -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
    
Primary schooling 0.029** 0.034** 0.033** 0.041** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
 
    
Tertiary schooling 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.014 
 
(0.073) (0.082) (0.081) (0.094) 
 
    
Bank Z-score -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
    
Bank concentration -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
Financial openness -0.027** -0.030** -0.030** -0.034** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
 
    
GDP agriculture minus services -0.135 -0.141 -0.14 -0.149 
 
(0.127) (0.144) (0.143) (0.168) 
 
    
Observations 2070 2070 2070 2070 
Number of instruments 225 89 56 40 
Hansen J test p-value 1.000 0.014 0.055 0.481 
AR2 test p-value 0.304 0.815 0.724 0.224 
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Table 4. The Determinants of FX Volatility 
Fixed Effects Model (GMM) 
PCA Control Variables Assumed to be Strictly Exogenous 
 
The table reports the results of estimating the dynamic panel data model given by Equation 
(2) for the sample of 115 countries over the period 1996-2015 using one-step system GMM. 
The control variables are replaced by their first four principal components, and are assumed 
to be strictly exogenous. In specifications (1) and (3), all lags from 2 onwards are used as 
GMM instruments. In specifications (2) and (4), lags 2 and 3 are used as GMM instruments. 
In specifications (3) and (4), the GMM instruments are collapsed into a single column. Year 
dummies are included in the estimation but not reported. The table reports the estimated 
coefficients and robust standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. The Hansen J test tests the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid in the presence of overidentification. The AR2 test 
is the Arellano-Bond test of the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the 
errors of the first difference equation. The table also reports the number of observations and 
the number of instruments. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
  Lags used for GMM 2, - 2, 3 2, - 2, 3 
Instruments collapsed No No Yes Yes 
     
Volatility (t – 1) 0.410*** 0.371*** 0.378*** 0.342*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) 
     
Volatility (t – 2) 0.143*** 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.081** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034) 
Control variables 
     
PC1 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
 
    
PC2 -0.031* -0.033* -0.033* -0.035* 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
 
    
PC3 0.085*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
 
    
PC4 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) 
“Soft power” variables 
     
Political stability -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 
 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) 
 
    
Voice and accountability -0.062** -0.072** -0.070** -0.079** 
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(0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
 
    
Life expectancy  -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
    
Primary schooling 0.029** 0.034** 0.033** 0.038** 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
 
    
Tertiary schooling -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
 
(0.067) (0.076) (0.075) (0.083) 
 
    
Bank Z-score -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
    
Bank concentration -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
Financial openness -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
 
    
GDP agriculture minus services -0.237* -0.246* -0.244* -0.253 
 
(0.123) (0.141) (0.137) (0.155) 
 
    
Observations 2070 2070 2070 2070 
Number of instruments 219 83 50 34 
Hansen J test p-value 1.000 0.010 0.152 0.769 
AR2 test p-value 0.422 0.929 0.921 0.245 
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Table 5. The Determinants of FX Volatility 
Fixed Effects Model (GMM) 
PCA Control Variables Assumed to be Endogenous 
 
The table reports the results of estimating the dynamic panel data model given by Equation 
(2) for the sample of 115 countries over the period 1996-2015 using one-step system GMM. 
The control variables are replaced by their first four principal components, and are assumed 
to be endogenous. In specifications (1) and (4), lags 2 and 3 are used as GMM instruments. 
In specifications (2) and (5), only lag 2 is used as a GMM instrument. In specification (3), all 
lags from 2 onwards are used as GMM instruments. In specifications (3), (4) and (5), the 
GMM instruments are collapsed into a single column. Year dummies are included in the 
estimation but not reported. The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard 
errors. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. The Hansen J test tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
in the presence of overidentification. The AR2 test is the Arellano-Bond test of the null 
hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the errors of the first difference equation. 
The table also reports the number of observations and the number of instruments. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
 
 
 
 Lags used for GMM 2, 3 2, 2 2, - 2, 3 2, 2 
Instruments collapsed No No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Volatility (t – 1) 0.366*** 0.324*** 0.337*** 0.319*** 0.436 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.042) (0.292) 
      
Volatility (t – 2) 0.117*** 0.082** 0.091*** 0.079** 0.208 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.286) 
Control variables 
      
PC1 -0.002 -0.024 0.002 -0.031 -0.097 
 
(0.025) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.100) 
 
     
PC2 -0.107*** -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.151*** -0.112 
 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.069) 
 
     
PC3 0.157*** 0.193*** 0.164*** 0.205*** 0.280** 
 
(0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.123) 
 
     
PC4 0.186*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.287*** 
 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.073) 
“Soft power” variables 
      
Political stability 0.057 0.068 0.069* 0.086* 0.119 
 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.039) (0.047) (0.132) 
 
     
Voice and accountability -0.168*** -0.212*** -0.189*** -0.245*** -0.282** 
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(0.043) (0.054) (0.053) (0.061) (0.137) 
 
     
Life expectancy  -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
     
Primary schooling 0.038** 0.045** 0.042** 0.046** 0.034 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.041) 
 
     
Tertiary schooling -0.096 -0.119 -0.105 -0.123 -0.246 
 
(0.084) (0.097) (0.096) (0.104) (0.219) 
 
     
Bank Z-score -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
     
Bank concentration 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
     
Financial openness -0.034** -0.038** -0.037** -0.038** -0.029 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.033) 
 
     
GDP agriculture minus services -0.522*** -0.556*** -0.596*** -0.613*** -0.633* 
 
(0.172) (0.210) (0.207) (0.227) (0.341) 
 
     
Observations 2070 2070 2070 2070 2070 
Number of instruments 287 202 126 42 37 
Hansen J test p-value 1.000 1.000 0.570 0.090 0.329 
AR2 test p-value 0.967 0.410 0.438 0.105 0.733 
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Table A1. Sample of Countries 
 
The table reports the 115 countries that are used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Algeria Ecuador Lao People's Dem. Rep. Portugal 
Argentina Egypt                Latvia               Romania 
Armenia El Salvador Lesotho              Russian Federation 
Australia Estonia              Libya                Saudi Arabia 
Austria Finland Lithuania            Senegal 
Bahrain France Luxembourg Sierra Leone 
Barbados Gabon                Malawi               Singapore            
Belgium Germany Malaysia             South Africa 
Belize Ghana                Maldives             Spain 
Benin Greece Mali                 Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Guatemala            Malta                Swaziland            
Botswana Guyana               Mauritius Sweden 
Brazil Haiti                Mexico Switzerland          
Burundi Honduras             Moldova              Tanzania             
Cambodia Hungary              Morocco              Thailand 
Cameroon Iceland              Mozambique           Togo                 
Canada India Namibia              Trinidad and Tobago 
Central African Rep. Indonesia            Netherlands Tunisia 
Chile Iran New Zealand  Turkey 
China Ireland Nicaragua            Uganda               
Hong Kong Israel               Niger                Ukraine 
Colombia Italy Norway United Arab Emirates 
Congo Jamaica              Pakistan United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Japan                Panama               United States 
Côte d'Ivoire Jordan Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Cyprus Kazakhstan           Paraguay             Venezuela 
Czech Republic Kenya                Peru Vietnam 
Denmark Korea Philippines Yemen 
Dominican Republic Kuwait Poland                
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Table A2. Variable Definitions 
 
The table reports the variables used in the empirical analysis, their definitions, sources and 
expected signs. Panel A reports details of the control variables, while Panel B reports details 
of the “soft power” variables. 
 
Panel A: Control Variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source Expected sign 
Inflation Annual growth of rate of country level CPI 
inflation 
IMF  
Volatility of terms of trade 5y rolling standard deviation of annual country 
level terms of trade index growth 
IMF  
Volatility of labour 
productivity growth 
5y rolling standard deviation of annual labour 
productivity growth for each country. 
Productivity is calculated as real GDP divided 
by total employment 
UNCTAD  
Volatility of gov con/GDP 5y rolling standard deviation of annual 
government consumption to GDP ratio 
UNCTAD  
Current account 
balance/GDP 
Annual current account balance to GDP ratio IMF  
Trade openness Real exports plus real imports divided by real 
GDP 
UNCTAD  
Export concentration index Concentration indices of merchandise exports 
and imports by country. 
UNCTAD  
FX regime FX regime dummy condensed between 1 
(fixed) and 3 (free float), based on the official 
IMF exchange rate classification 
IMF  
Credit/GDP The ratio of domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector to GDP 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
 
Stock market cap/GDP The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
 
 
Panel B: “Soft Power” Variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source Expected sign 
    
Governance variables 
    
Political stability  The likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically- motivated violence, including 
terrorism 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Negative 
Government effectiveness  The quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Negative 
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independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Regulatory quality  The ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Negative 
Rule of law The extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Negative 
Control of corruption  The extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Negative 
Voice & accountability The extent to which a country's citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Negative 
    
Population variables 
    
Median age Median age of the total population UN World Pop 
Prospects 
Negative 
Total fertility Number of children per woman UN World Pop 
Prospects 
Positive 
Infant mortality Infant mortality rate for both sexes combined UN World Pop 
Prospects 
Positive 
Life expectancy  Life expectancy at birth for both sexes 
combined 
UN World Pop 
Prospects 
Negative 
Child dependency ratio Ratio of population aged 0-14 per 100 
population aged 15-64 
UN World Pop 
Prospects 
Positive 
    
Education variables 
    
Primary schooling  Average years of primary schooling, age 15+ World Bank Negative 
Secondary schooling Average years of secondary schooling, age 15+ World Bank Negative 
Tertiary schooling Average years of tertiary schooling, age 15+ World Bank Negative 
    
Financial variables 
    
Z-score of banks  (ROA+(equity/assets))/st. dev(ROA) where st. 
dev(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA 
calculated from underlying bank-by-bank 
unconsolidated data from Bankscope).    
World Bank Negative 
Bank concentration Assets of three largest commercial banks as a 
share of total commercial banking assets 
World Bank Positive 
Financial Openness  The Chinn-Ito index measuring a country's 
degree of capital account openness  
http://web.pdx.edu/~i
to/Chinn-
Negative 
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Ito_website.htm   
    
 
Economic development variables 
    
GDP per capita Real GDP divided by total population UNCTAD Negative 
% GDP agriculture - % 
GDP service sector 
% share of agricultural sector in total GDP 
minus % share of service sector in total GDP 
UNCTAD Positive 
% GDP of agriculture % share of agricultural sector in total GDP UNCTAD Positive 
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